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Book Reviews 
Coleridge, The Damaged Archangel by Norman Fruman. New York: George 
Braziller, 1971. Pp. xxiii + 607 .. $12.50. 
Among Coleridgeans this book will produce waves of discussion. Up from 
the ranks of the compatriots will come defenders of Coleridge's originality (at 
once raising the question as to what it is to be original), while the unser 
Shakespeare tribe of Gennanophiles will announce that here at last we have the 
proof that most of STC's important ideas, especially those involving the psychol-
ogy and metaphysics of art (theory of imagination), the aesthetic distinction 
between organic and other types of form, the magisterial importance of Shake-
speare as ultimate author-and perhaps other ideas I have forgotten to mention-
derive almost word for word from various Gennan critics, chief of whom must 
be August Wilhelm Schlegel, younger brother of Friedrich Schlegel. A battle 
pro and contra will surely take place, and its field will have been staked out, 
however roughly, by Nonnan Froman's Coleridge: The Damaged Archangel. 
Fruman has once again gone over the ground harrowed by Rene Wellek, 
who for many years now has been insisting that Coleridge was a weak philos-
opher and, since philosophy of some kind was his pretended contribution to 
English studies, by the same token a weak critic. On any estimate Wellek's 
Coleridge is a badly tarnished angel, if not completely fragmented. Fruman, of 
course, does not intend his damaged archangel to be thrown into the junk-shop. 
Rather, he wants a cleaner critical and historical approach to Coleridge, cleaner 
and also, oddly, more commonsensical, than has hitherto been easy or likely. 
He has done what Welle1e, under suspicion as a continental polymath of strong 
Gennanic leanings, could hardly afford to do without incurring the anglophiliac 
wrath: he has put together H against" STC a great big book of evidence for 
an indictment of grand larceny, widespread embezzlement and gross, disingenuous 
bad faith. The case has many angles, and it looks bad for the defendant. On 
the other hand, only a skillful prosecutor wiII be able to steer such a rich 
indictment past the pretrial publicity of the Coleridgean Establishment. For-
tunately for the spectators, Norman Fruman is a very active, theatrically 
impressive D.A. 
The present "review" is, unfortunately for the expert who will certainly 
want to examine Fruman's case more closely, a mere courtroom sketch, written 
by a journalist, and smuggled out of closed sessions in the hope of suggesting 
what the trial is like. I leave it to others who have gone adequately into the 
critical work of the Gennan romantics and specifically of A. W. Schlegel and 
Sche1ling to detennine whether The Damaged A1'changel has respected all the 
main rules of evidence. Rather I shall be giving my impressions of an indictment, 
without any clear confidence about the final sentence. 
In compiling massive documentary evidence to show how, time after time, 
one of Coleridge's more "inspired" moments was in fact a piece of shop-lifting, 
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Noonan Fruman has had to write a big book. He notes, with Callimachus, that 
"a big book is a big misfortune." But how could it have been otherwise? 
Smallness of compass, imposed by other interests, was exactly what made it 
difficult for Wellek to get his case against Coleridge to stick. (In the vast cor-
ridors of Wellek's History of Modern Literary Criticism Coleridge could only 
have a chapter; there were others to consider, among them the very sages and 
seers whose pockets the English visitor so cahnly rifled.) At least one reaction 
to Wellek on STC's thefts from Schlegel or Schelling was animated by the 
continuing thought that, well, there was another side to the whole business-
perhaps after all Coleridge may have thought of Shakespeare in what amounted 
to Schlegelian tenns, before going to Germany at the tum of the century, and 
if so, then the "debts" to the German critic were complex, delicate and prob-
ably of no final importance. And anyway, one added as an afterthought, 
Schlegel didn't really count for much as a literary critic-who, in the English-
speaking world, had even read him? As a learned and luminous modern scholar 
put it: "[Coleridge] also studied, and probably over-rated, the German Shal{e-
speare criticism of the preceding half-century." 
Perhaps the right antidote to unthinking adulation of Coleridgean originality 
(defined as perfect literal independence of previous authors) would be, besides 
the massive dose provided by Froman in toto, a comment which he quotes from 
the remarks of William Hazlitt, who, in December 1820, wrote a "Conversation 
on the Drama with Coleridge." In this imaginary conversation HazIitt has 
Coleridge say: '" But a French play (I think it is Schlegel who somewhere 
makes the comparison, though I had myself, before I ever read Schlegel, made 
the same remark) is like a child's garden set with slips of branches and Rowers, 
stuck in the ground, not growing in it '." This is double-edged, to be sure, 
striking at the "organicism" of the romantic school as much as at STC's foible 
of unacknowledged free-loading. Fruman's note (page 488, no. 69) continues 
in the same vein: "Elsewhere in this neglected essay Hazlitt has Coleridge 
remark of the French: 'Their style of dancing is difficult; would it were 
impossible.''' To this Hazlitt appends the footnote: "This expression is borrowed 
from Dr. Johnson. However, as Dr. Johnson is not a German critic, Mr. C. 
need not be supposed to acknowledge it." Hazlitt, in short, like Wordsworth 
before him, and like De Quincey, knew that their acquaintance, Mr. C., was 
something of a grifter. Had they read Lowes' Road to Xanadu, they would 
surely have said, "You don't know the half of it." It would seem that, in one 
way or another, the damaged archangel thought little of heisting large ship-
ments of (preferably German) ore, which without acknowledgment he then 
led his readers to believe that he, STC, had mined in a heroic assault on the 
darkness of the lower depths. 
One aim of Froman's large biographical essay is to show just how varied was 
this borrowing, snatching, grabbing, remembering, copying, lifting and petty 
theft. The story itself provides considerable entertainment. Its plot is: where 
will the angel strike next? Because Fruman has a novelist's interest in the 
psychology of Colcridgean kleptomania, he can carry us through the dismal 
long terrain, in whose fearful passage the doomed poet/critic often approaches 
madness. Throughout Fl1lman remains empathetic, if not sympathetic. There are 
times when even his negative capability toward STC seems to have been strained-
the relations commonly thought to have existed between STC and Wordsworth 
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he finds unfairly weighted, so as to hurt Wordsworth's reputation. It appears 
to Fruman that Coleridge learned, that is, took, more from his austere friend 
than critics have been wHIing to admit. And there arc times when, almost 
abstractly, without regard to the hurt imposed on some unacknowledged 
"source," Coleridgeal1 plagiarism seems to offend Fruman's moral sense. And 
it offends his sense of history. Criticism relates closely to science, and in 
science priority of discovery is a recognized achievement, since science assumes 
the reality of material progress. From the scientific angle the question is inter-
esting, _ if not finally crucial. Simultaneity of scientific discovery suggests that 
the determination of critical "originality" wiII be a tricky matter. Yet it 
remains well worth studying. 
The question of originality thus raised has, however, a dimension which 
Norman Froman seems either to have dismissed for strategic reasons, or not 
to have envisaged. In its more general fonn this dimension of the problem 
may be stated as a question: if the critic lifts other critics' words, phrases and 
paragraphs en bloc, without acknowledgement, in what way, precisely, does 
that lifting detract from the critic's presumed originality? The question obviously 
has two halves, neither of them very definitely circumscribed. On the one side 
there is the lifting itself-what are we to say about it? Is .vhat is plagiarized 
itself a sort of objet trouve, or is it "stolen property," and if the latter, does 
the theft become significant because it violates the letter or the spirit of copy-
right law? And on the other side, how shall we define the nature of a critical 
"originality? " The Damaged Archangel certainly provides much detail to indi-
cate what kinds of things Coleridge would lift, the most famous of them being 
the passage on Imagination in the Biographia Literaria, a direct steal from 
Schelling, according to most authorities. 
But the book does not ask that framing, double-edged question, and in this, 
to be fair, the case against Coleridge is flawed. From The D({maged Archangel 
one would never guess that our recent period has been one of acute, often rather 
painful recognition that Coleridge, like other critical minds seeking a wider 
. basis for criticism, was often working in areas beyond the confines of "academic 
source studies." Such studies are usually underrated; they require great skill 
and endless patience, with wide reading. Fruman would appear to be a masterful 
source-hunter. Yet his lack of a theory of intellectual origins leaves his demon-
stration of certain or less than certain, but still probable, thefts settled perilously 
on the edge of massive irrelevance. To repeat, it is not without interest or 
importance for us to learn that Coleridge (or any other critic) has stolen this 
or that from some prior worker. But in the case of Coleridge the critic himself 
had already raised, in a hundred ways, the question as to what poetical and 
intellectual originality really is. His manifest method of creating poems out of 
a mosaic of his own reading already suggests part of the problem, namely that 
he possibly (granting for the moment that Fruman's and W cliek's evidence holds 
up, a matter on which only experts can judge), very possibly, located poetry 
and criticism close to each other, and applied the same rules of composition 
to the one as to the other. It is only after determining if and how this is or 
is not so that one can then proceed to create the case in a strict evidential 
demonstration. 
To be quite brief about it, Coleridge probably took a "Renaissance" attitude 
toward his thefts. While he may indeed have felt guilty about them, he found 
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them necessary for his work, as Shakespeare found it necessary to take whole 
speeches, not to mention story-lines, etc. from other authors. The example of 
Shakespeare may have been impressive to Coleridge. Since he regarded the 
Bard's work as practically "scientific," he may have assumed for himself a 
license he well knew his model to have practised. The guilt that accompanied 
the thefts belongs in part to STC's own extremely complex web of private fears 
and anxieties, and at the same time could well be a product of an early 19th-
century rise in attention to the private, saleable property of authors. But the 
guilt needs to be distinguished from the act itself, which could have reasons 
of its own, based on a theory of invention closely resembling that of the Renais-
sance poets and critics, who rarely acknowledge each other's materials, while 
taking them over and putting to new uses and displaying them in new settings-
in translations, for example. This may be associated, as a theory of invention, 
with Shakespeare, while it is opposed to the attitudes and behavior of Ben 
Jonson, who remains a detennined minority voice, always willing (perhaps 
because proud of his book-learning) to "acknowledge his sources." 
One aspect of the Fruman inquest is particularly moving, in the light of this 
problem of the theory of plagiarism. To his subject Fruman is stern, but 
entirely (or ahnost entirely) forgiving. He is attempting to be understanding, 
as Gertrude Stein would put it. This attempt gives this book a sense of search 
for its own raison d'etre, for it follows that if STC was such a rank plagiarist, 
as this indictment makes him appear, then we as critics are left wondering how 
to relate to (a) the plagiarized material and (b) its plagiarist. Both relations to 
the divine ldeptomane will be complex, and Fruman gives many, and many 
times very expressive, examples of this complexity. 
The first source of complication lies outside Coleridge himself, even outside 
his work. It is the bias, the Anglo-Gennan rivalry, the general ignorance of 
German materials which pervades the English literary scene, the tendency toward 
isolationism along lines of national literature rather than European community-
in short, the whole atmosphere under which debate about STC and his literary 
relations must occur. A final estimate of his indebtedness to others will owe a 
good deal, I should think, to the very open way in which Fruman has written 
about the matter. His style reflects one kind of openness; it is full of personal 
touches, and much of its length and breadth comes from a desire to give the 
whole picture as the author sees it. Such an approach is inherently lively, and 
in a way its particular triumphs and failures are far less important than the 
example itself, which may help to clear the Coleridgean air by drawing our 
attention to the possibility of bias in our judgments. To give only one instance 
of a source of bias: it is difficult for English-speaking people, native-born to 
the tongue of Shakespeare, to imagine that a foreign critic like A. W. Schlegel 
might have earlier and more perfectly perceived certain great Shakespearean 
qualities, and then articulated them with greater elegance than was managed 
by the Bard's own countryman. 
To sort out the failures of critics in seizing upon what he takes to be a 
more accurate picture of STC (the dust-jacket has four remarkable portraits of 
him, from youth to age), Fruman divides his book into three initial sections, 
which are followed by a radical extension of perspective in a final fourth section, 
.1 
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"Transfigured Night." Part I, "A Portrait in Mosaic," is an introductory tour 
through certain typifying Coleridgean plagiarisms, with a strong biographical 
coloration throughout. Poetry is the main issue here. Froman shows that STC 
early acquired the habit of making people think he was wunderkind, a self-
image which slowly developed, according to Fruman, into a tenacious complex 
form which Coleridge was never to escape. Part II deals largely with the 
expository critical writings, among them Biographia Literaria, the never finished 
"Opus Maximum," and the Shakespearean criticism. Here again Fruman docu-
ments what appear to be hundreds of thefts, large and small. Part III takes a 
similar approach to the greater poetry, including the work of the remarkable 
period when STC produced" The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," "Christabel," 
and" Kubla Khan." 
Sections I to III will stand or fall, as I have suggested, on the degree to 
which experts of German romantic criticism and of the other" original sources" 
involved come to accept or reject Fruman's allegations as proved or not. The 
point needs repetition: only experts can tell exactly how a particular "borrow-
ing" feels to them in the context of a whole canon. And this sort of discussion, 
provoked by the book, will be lively and useful and by no means ultimately 
destructive to Coleridge, though immediately embarrassing. This is perhaps the 
place to mention a most unfortunate lacuna in The Damaged Archangel. No 
doubt for reasons of timing (date of publication, etc.) Fruman does not mention 
McFarland's Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition, a profoundly learned study 
in German sources, a work written from that point of view yet colored through-
out by an uncanny awareness of the Coleridgean mind and its reticulative method. 
Other interesting and important recent books come to mind at this juncture: 
it is too bad not to have had Fruman's reaction to Basil Willey's study of STC's 
religious development, Owen Barfield's new study, Haven's book, and so on. 
This vigorous publishing activity suggests the scope of present interest in 
Coleridge, but it is hard to introduce others into a "big book" sometimes. 
Richard Haven, at least, is an enlivening source for Fruman (the 1HZ article 
on "Coleridge, Hartley, and the Mystics," dating back to 1959!), but his 
recently published book on Coleridge is not referred to. We are reminded of 
the unwieldy inefficiency of books of criticism-a problem of great interest to 
STC himself-and can only regret that here, as so often, the pressures of time 
and history prevented a confrontation between Fruman and McFarland. In that 
case at least, I believe it was historically possible for Fruman to have known 
McFarland's work. However, these decalages get sorted out in time (though 
we do really need more discussion about the role of speed and timing in the 
publication of ideas). 
It is Part IV of The Damaged Archangel that, so to speak, exists by itself. 
Humanly considered, it is the climactic portion of this biography of a mind. 
The scene owes much to the magnificent scholarly work of Coburn, Griggs 
and others who have gradually presented to us the Notebooks, the Letters, 
and the endless bits and pieces of Coleridgean rumination and marginalian magic. 
Fruman's chapter headings, "Themes," "Dreams," "The Unreconciled Opposites," 
"Shipwreck and Safe Harbor," tell much of the story. This part of the book 
will be read with profit by every student of literature, since it strongly conveys 
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the terror that beset Coleridge during most of his life and dragged him often 
to the edge of insanity. With admirable coolness, Froman shows many details, 
one of which, infinitely suggestive and more austere in its frpson than most, 
comes in the record of a dream of December 6, 1803: 
Adam travelling in his old age came to a set of the descendants of Cain, 
ignorant of the origin of the world & treating him as a Madman killed 
him. A Sort of Dream, which I had this night. (Quoted Damaged 
Archangel, 379) 
The interest of Froman's fourth section lies in its method. Thus, with the· 
dream of the murder of Adam, he surrounds the quote with a revealing network 
of associative materials, all of which help to explicate the dream, some subtly, 
others grossly. In tins instance, for example, he notes that II the day b~ore 
Coleridge had written a letter (perhaps in the hours just before going to sleep) 
to one Matthew Coates; the letter deals primarily with his own projected 
travels, following upon his decision to leave his wife and children to seek health 
9.broad." (380) The movement of commentary is back and forth between dream 
and the total verbal/physical scene in which the dream comes into b~ing as a 
written object. 
Once again a question of theory (or perhaps only orientation) arises: what 
in principle is the relation between dream and reality, with an author of the 
Coleridgean stamp? Froman does have a general view, to be sure, though it 
rests in a curiously" classical" Freudianisr;n of biography. I have nothing against 
the great master of mind, but it has to be said, over and over, that Coleridge 
in part is difficult to understand because he was busy drawing out tlte complexi-
ties of mind that exist "over and above" a Freudian dynamic. The "over and 
above" involves problems of perception (to which Patricia Ball has drawn 
attention in her monograph, The Science of Aspects: The Changing Role of 
Fact in ,be Work of Coleridge, Ruskin and Hopkins [London, 1971]), ·of meta-
physics and semantics, and of certain literary concerns which circle about 
Coleridge'S quite peculiar attitude toward Shakespeare. 
Fruman has suggested. particularly in his illuminating pages on the poet's 
unhappy youth, on the Coleridge/Wordsworth connection, as well as through-
out The Damaged Archangel in lesser matters, that Coleridge never resolved 
a basic problem of authority. On the one hand, according to this view, he 
always wanted to be taken for more pure, more right, more genial than in [;lct 
he was or could have been, he too being mortal and limited by space, time 
and death. This wunderkind complex took deep root. Not only so, but deeper 
roots went down from other quite private Coleridgean fears-can one imagine 
a relation tenser or more problematic than that connecting Coleridge and the 
two Wordsworths? The one-time "inspired charity boy" floated through life 
on a sea of guilt, fearful of incestuous longings that arose from a more or less 
cruel maternal upbringing and the sudden, Oedipally-freighted loss of his father 
(over which Coleridge had. in effect, Freud's "dream of the death of the 
beloved "). In handling such psychic history Froman is resolutely the classic 
Freudian, admirably straight-forward, undeterred by more recent, largely Euro-
pean decorations of the Freudian dynamic of repression and i(S behavioral con-
sequences. The following gives a sample of the classic lingo: 
· pa~ 
·fillit 
· the 
· cleo 
mea 
.pe 
.of, 
"'" .(th, 
.. 'h« 
", 
rf 
y, 
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That the key role of horrible avenger is assigned to a demonic female 
provides the necessary clue which links "The Ancient Mariner" and 
" Christabel.ll If Coleridge's unconscious was roiled with oedipal or 
fraternal guilts, it was nevertheless the cruel mother who meted out the 
punishment, by banishment, by withdrawal of love. In all his subsequent 
crippled relationships with women, it was not a wife his longing spirit 
sought, but the sheltering love of the protective mother. [405 J 
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There is some Jungian equipment here too, but the dynamic of Fruman's biog-
raphy is a sympathetic, if perhaps not very subtle, use of Freud. But he does 
well with a number of diagnostic commentaries on various dreams and their 
place in the poet/critic's life. When he quotes a contemporary remark (it was 
in fact Dr. Gillman's) that Coleridge "was scrupulously clean in his person, 
and especially took great care of his hands by frequent ablutions," we are well 
situated by the critical text to use the remark in a Freudian (i.e., genetic and 
dynamic) search for the Coleridgean mind. Fruman is writing a psychobiography, 
a work not totally unlike Bate's biographies of Johnson and Keats (and to a 
lesser extent Bate's more modest and academic Coleridge). What always saves 
this book for the reader as a formalist, perhaps as a "structuralist," certainly a; 
an unwilling geneticist of the imagination, is the way Fruman simply fills his 
pages with anecdote, aside, marginalia, slivers of poetry, in short with all the 
fillings of a rich biographical cake. It is true, as Basil Willey recently remarked, 
the time is not quite ripe for a gigantic opus maximum on Coleridge (though 
clearly Willey felt that various giants might be lurking in the wings). In the 
meantime, The Damaged Archangel is inherently satisfying to read as biography, 
especially the "Transfigured Night" of STC's mental climate. The mere act 
of collecting the dreams in one place and stressing them frontally is an impor-
tant critical contribution, nicely illustrating the way in which technical innovation 
(the publication of the Notebooks, in this case) leads to new possibilities of 
theory and understanding. 
The present reviewer has only the roughest notion of how he would approach 
the Coleridgean life, let alone what is generally demanded by the exigencies 
of the subject as a whole. But there are some revealing oddities in the fon11al 
aspect of STC's production and life, which may be worth looking into more 
deeply. For example, why is Venus and Adonis the central Shakespearean 
instance of genius given in the Biograpbial Was Coleridge simply too lazy to 
give a larger case, Hamlet or Tbe Tempest? Is it simply, as he says, that this 
narrative poem shows how early real genius shows itself? Is that question, in 
turn, related to something going on in the Biographia as personal testament 
(however hastily and distractedly written)? 
Increasingly critics of Coleridge have given more attention to his ideas of 
U method." Both Richard Haven and J. R. de J. Jackson have writt~n about the 
relation between the theory of method and the Coleridgean performance. It 
begins to seem that the form of the Biograpbia Lite1'Ctria is its most brilliant 
invention. Perambulatory and wayward, this form suggests, among other things, 
that when (ahnost alone among English critics of his time) Coleridge b2gan 
to think seriously about method and wrote his Essays on Method, he had to 
adopt the prefatory indirection which life itself tends to possess. Coleridge 
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became systematically and deliberately wayward; he, like Hegel (on whom, in 
this connection, the reader may consult ]. Derrida, De la Dissemination, "Hol'S 
livre," pp. 1-66), began to pay his respects to the preliminary aspect of real 
invention and insight. 
In the same sense Coleridge may have been deliberately and systematically a 
kleptomaniac. This is not quite a paradox. Like many obsessed persons, that 
is, like many in the throes of the classical Freudian's "obsessional neurosis," 
Coleridge knew perfectly well what he was doing. This at least is the most 
economic assumption to make. Obsession is the one neurosis we can, and do, 
all live with; it is the basis, for example, of almost all difficult intellectual labor. 
According to such a view, Coleridge would then continue to thrive, because 
theft corresponded to his vast obsessive II method" of understanding the true 
nature of literary" property." If a passage was worth quoting, as the Renaissance 
humanists insisted, it was worth stealing. This "stealing" is personally tricky 
for the thief, if it induces guilt; at the same time its secrecy gives him an 
immediate access to parts of a verbal universe in which words, as such, are no 
one's property. On such a view (though not in terms of the literary marketplace 
and its copyright conventions), Coleridge had "a right to" anything said on 
the subject of his idol, Shakespeare. This "right" followed from the suspended 
belief that Shakespeare and the critique of Shakespeare were part of a larger 
theoretical whole which no individual could "own" in any ordinary sense. There 
is a sort of unique communism, a vague remnant of youthful pantisocratic hopes, 
lingering in everything Coleridge later accomplished. And he was living in the 
age of de facto property-enhancement. What is raised so well by Froman's 
courageous book is the whole question of ownezship in the literary domain. 
The theory of ownership is close to the theory of literary influence; both require 
the kind of sympathetic analysis which, from various quarters, they are beginning 
to get. 
Furthermore, one emphasis, on guilt, is also an important directive for 
Coleridgean studies (as his fond admirers have really always known). Fruman 
has frankly approached this gnilt. But the experience of gnilt is not directly 
related to the acts we perform. It is always involved in a refraction of a virtuous 
desire to do the non-guilt-producing thing; in short, often those feel guilty who 
have no clear, direct reason for their feeling of guilt. In the case of Coleridge 
one senses sometimes that he accepted anxiety and guilt as a catalytic condition 
of his genius. He worked the fields of guilt. Coleridge happy, in a down-home 
way, is inconceivable, because he refused to entertain the idea. His identification 
with Hamlet is the structural principle of his life. No wonder he thought he 
owned Schlegel et alf 
To get at the structural relation berween the Coleridgean theft and the form 
of his writing and thought, we shall have to envisage the "methodical" shape 
of the "literary life," as he conceived it. This speculation has scarcely been 
attempted as yet, though Jackson has written a book on Coleridge and method 
that places us inside the periphery of the problem. The key to a further advance 
seems to me to be a flexible, unacademic study of Coleridge and the idea of 
religion. Both McFarland and Willey, in major texts, and many others in 
detailed articles and monographs, have begun to provide the technical equipment 
for snch a study. 
For the problem of authority, with Coleridge as with most metaphysically 
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inclined persons, comes down to a relation between the self and the religious 
life. He is at once in a complex situation, since criticism, on his own view, 
was a kind of science, whereas his own leanings were toward numinous explana-
tion. That Coleridge was not alone in feeling the tug between critical and 
religious thought is apparent in the work of all subsequent 19th centUlY English 
critics, perhaps most memorably in Matthew Arnold, but in fact across the 
board. A triadic sequence of questions becomes the issue: criticism (a science)-
poetry (an action)-religion (a belief): requiring to be interrelated as they arc 
by the H literary life." Without making this triadic analysis it will appear, as 
unfortunately Fruman's book makes it seem, that Coleridge's brain evaporated 
some time soon after 1820, if not before. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. His later writing is as brilliant and moving as anything he produccd. It 
is, however, based on the religious side of the triad, and this aspcct of things is 
less accessible to most of us. 
Every critic of Coleridge will have a preferred mode of approach to his 
many-sided mind. One approach that has been inadequately explored is the 
question of Shakespeare's importance to his worshipper. To my knowledge no 
critic has shown why, when commenting on the theory of the Bible and its 
vast exploratory fonn (in Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit), Coleridge is led 
to speak of Shakespeare. A returning obsession? Nor, more important to begin 
with, what is -the role of this "Shakespeare" in the Biograpbia, the Essays on 
Method, and the desultory, troubled lectures which seem, from our vcrbatim-
note remnants, to have been a wcird, semi-private monologue on the "true 
meaning" of the Bard's existence. (See, for these, R. A. Foakes' new edition 
of the 1811-12 lectures, Coleridge on Shakespeare, which is furthennore a mono-
graph on that interesting man, J. P. Collier). Shakespeare is the central, struc-
turing, leading, guiding light and heat (however one wants to imagine the 
process) and finally also a comforting mask in the Coleridgean dream. 
Admitting that we are in the midst of a debate, we can say perhaps that 
Shakespeare provided for Coleridge the model for thinking about "method." 
Although "method" is a sign of the coming of the modern world, insofar as 
it defines the Renaissance attitude toward the connection of time and thought, 
\vhen Coleridge found that he too responded to the problem of method, he also 
found that his Shakespearean inheritance could enrich and clarify the response. 
He must have felt that his philosophical raids on Germany, besides giving him 
a newly thing-filled philosophic diction (the German agglutinative semantic), 
gave him also a sense of the rightness of his belief in Shakespeare. For if it was 
"religious," it had to be "right," since religion is a matter, not of exterior proof, 
but of faith. As the domain of implicit coherence, religion communized the 
ownership of any ideas that would support the belief in Shakespeare. To suggest 
that Schlegel or Schelling (the latter on Imagination) was a "source" might 
well violate the sense of mysteries, which requires a mute recognition of what 
Freud said his informants called the "oceanic" aspect of religion. (Which of 
course puzzled the terrene Freud no end.) One can imagine a Coleridgean 
rumination going somewhat like this: "I have slowly discovered that my 
, philosophy' is a deviation from a fantastic, imaginative literature in which 
metaphysics are always implicit. Philosophy can only be the hidden dimension, 
the tacit dimension, of a great literature that has religious force. Open it out 
(as you must with philosophic devices of a technical nature, i.e., the specific 
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words or terms of Schlegel or some other), and you will kill its mystery. In 
fact I began to think this way when I met Wordsworth, for whom philosophy 
is an art of poetic implication. At that time too Dorothy vVordsworth showed 
me the implicit structure of the landscape, which I could then contemplate in 
its living line, as if I could live the line of the mountain ridges. Writing my 
own better poems, on supernatural subjects of great terror, I found that for me 
method could never be explicit. It had to reside in the act, as its buried but 
constant life. 'l\'.lechanical' and 'organic' were then merely names for some-
thing which the Wordsworths taught me to recognize, and because a recognition 
had already occurred with them, there was scarcely a chance that I could or 
should acknowledge any 'sources' in anyone else. I could only acknowledge 
other mutual recognitions, and they already belonged to the realm of com-
mon understanding. Those who seek my sources must not forget my life." 
Such imaginary monologues are nothing, compared with history. If one 
approach to a history of Coleridge'S troubled life is to find, aided by the increas-
ing bulk of published Coleridgeana, what happened to him as he went along, 
another will be to speculate on his own utterances about history and the social 
life of man, an increasing preoccupation as he grew older and survived. Another 
method will be to return to the great poems, adding to them certain lesser poems 
of great technical bravura. Basic to a finer grasp of the whole life will be a 
close acquaintance with the Coleridge/Wordsworth bond. And above all, the 
Coleridge/Shakespeare connection. This last, as its student soon discovers, leads 
to a large and difficult field of study: the role of philosophy in English letters 
(e.g., why so different from France and Gennany, in this respect?). 
]\,Tonnan Fruman has, I think, done a lot to get such questions into a wider 
domain than any previous author of our time, except Dr. Richards. Fruman has 
done this simply by being interested in Coleridge the man. About most human, 
personal, character-judgments there will be some argument, and Fruman will 
find those who don't like his portrait at all. But the overall effect is strong 
and useful, since implicit in The Damaged Archangel is a systematic awareness 
that whatever is literary in Coleridge is importantly touched by a biographia 
of some kind. Fruman is often stiff-he belongs to the great tradition of puritan 
biographers-but he is not a fanatic. He has wonderful notes, like most, but 
not all, devoted Coleridgeans, and they fill about 130 pages of his book. And he 
has an expansiveness which goes with his roughness. Every so often the pathos 
of STC's life, which is so very difficult to describe convincingly, or sometimes 
even to believe in (writers are driven to speaking about his "terrifying" dreams, 
nightmares, drug symptoms, etc.), and the finally absolute quality of Coleridge's 
physical survival at Highgate, in Malta, in the Lake Country, everywhere, come 
across in Fruman's account with their true Wordsworthian austerity. Close to 
the end of The Damaged Archangel Fruman has occasion to summarize the 
poet's familial history: 
Hartley [Coleridge'S son and the" dear babe" of "Frost at Midnight," 
a born genius, for whom the poet said he. dreamed so much good] was 
thirty-eight years old when his father died. In all those thirty-eight 
years he did not live in his father's presence for as much as five years. 
Coleridge's brilliant daughter, Sara, who was to do so much for his 
after-fame, did not see him once between her tenth and twentieth years. 
(432) 
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in One final reversal of position: I may have suggested, in commenting adversely 
lYon the lack of a theory of originality and literary theft, that Nonnan Froman is 
;d insensitive to what he himself once calls the "quintessentiilly Coleridgean." 
's I 
That would be a harsh, stupid judgment. The very first line of this book breathes 
the atmosphere of being in the Colcridgean presence. In the inevitably twisting, 
over-played, critically garrulous search for the final identity of the Involuntary 
Imposter, Fruman has himself entered the path of Coleridgean method. In this 
path the mind, as he says, "turns to origins." (331) The Damaged Archangel 
lives its own life, full of its own sense of self-discovery. This may be inefficient, 
and it seems to accompany what will be called a philosophic and psychoanalytic 
naivete, but it is a very Coleridgean production. Thus, although the book leaves 
a great deal to be unearthed, understood and formulated, and though perhaps 
it imagines itself as conquering more territory than it actually holds, it is still 
tremendously readable. Through its stress on the poet/critic's dreams it is 
critically innovative. There is a kind of bluff commonsense that breathes fresh 
air into a heavy ambience. 
One wonders, of course, what Coleridge would say about all our recent 
interest in him. Perhaps we should be to him as Keats was, when they met 
one afternoon in the street. Coleridge was walking along slowly, at his alder-
man's pace, with another man. Keats observed that STC was caught in the 
stream of his own monologue, and as the two parted, the older man's voice 
could be heard disappearing in the distance, leaving behind it the fragments of 
an endless recital of an infinite blueprint of mental stimuli. What are we, then, 
to such a man? 
ANGUS FLETCHER 
SUNY Buffalo 
The Philosophy of Art by Giovanni Gentile, translated by Giovanni Gullace. 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972. Pp. c + 292. $15.00. 
One of the more important parts of The Philosophy of Art is Gentile's logi-
cally rigorous enquiry into the experiential relationship between poetry and 
criticism. Italian thought concerning this relationship was much the same in 
1931, when Gentile first published his book, as American thought was thirty 
years later, when Murray Krieger looked back upon the problems of the new 
apologists for poetry. For both Benedetto Croce, whose thought dominated 
Italian aesthetics through the first third of the century, and the New Critics, the 
difficulties of this relationship stemmed from their special sense of the radical 
difference between poetry and criticism. For both, poetry was thought to be a 
seamless unity, an autonomous organism, a fusion of intuition and expression, 
whereas criticism was viewed as analytical, intellectual, a practical endeavor 
whose objective lies outside itself in the wholeness of poetry. 
According to the profoundest understanding of the New Critical position, that 
of Eliseo Vivas, in the experience of a poem the reader ceases to be himself 
and becomes the poem; aesthetic attention, intransitive attention, is selfless; one 
sees with the eyes of the poem, one is the being of the poem. Criticism, which 
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necessarily follows the aesthetic experience, is reiiective; it is the effort to point .' : !ee[ 
out those elements in one's experience of the poem which are most important abo 
to it as an aesthetic experience, for the purpose of helping others work to the dUI 
point of losing themselves in the poem, of becoming the poem. The drastic by' 
limitation of all criticism, viewed in this way, is that the critic can say nothing I 
about the poem as a whole, as a totality, because in experiencing the poem he ' the 
in fact became that whole, he was utterly identical with it. His acutest aware- mel 
ness, in other words, was indistinguishable from the awareness of the poem. baa 
Afterwards, he could talk about what he had been aware of, hut not about his !hi] 
awareness, because it is essential to aesthetic experience that we not be aware riot 
of such awareness, since self-consciousness would violate the wholeness of bee 
intransitive attention. Since the critic's awareness in the aesthetic experience is of 
identical with the totality of the poem, in not being able to speak critically about 001 
his awareness, he is incapable of speaking about the totality of the poem. He "~ 
mnst limit his speech to the parts of the poem, mowing that in the aesthetic of 
experience these parts had no distinct being apart from the entire poem as a ell 
seamless, organic whole. Such a predicament collapses criticism based upon a thi 
sense of the organic unity of poetry into criticism as paraphrase, a procedure du 
based on a sense of the poem as the sum of its separable parts. It is true that en 
as Empson atomizes a poem, he insists that his sense of multiplicity is governed !hI 
by a taste left in the head from the aesthetic experience, and it is true that his tii 
best analyses suggest some ineffable feeling as their source. It is also true that Ct 
Cleanth Brooks often refers an item discussed to the unruscussable "dramatic ho 
totality" of the poem under consideration. On the basis of what is actually po 
articulated in such analyses, however, the New Criticism can be distinguished til! 
from conventional paraphrase only as being unhappy with itself, aware of its eIj 
inadequacy, and longing to be other than itself. SIr 
So unhappy and anxious a situation could not endure, and the tensed bow 
snapped into two slack fragments, one dualistic, the other monistic. Northrop A( 
Frye adopted a positivistic dualism, content with intricate analyses umelated to ex 
aesthetic experience. For Frye, an abyss as wide as that between plum and sh 
botanist or physical event and physicist separates poem and critic. The critic can p~ 
say nothing about the poem as experienced; his responsibility is not to poems as in. 
read, but rather to the autonomous discipline of criticism. As a critic, Frye is sit 
cut off from poetry but not distressed by this as the New Critics were. Equally ~ 
free critical spirits are legion today, many following Frye, others adopting struc- .1 th 
turalist techniques, others modelling themselves on Heidegger's use of Holderlin 
to picture forth his own mind's desire, and still other.; imitating the autonomous 
criticism of Leslie Fiedler. 
In contrast to such dualistic criticism, other critics strive to write criticism 
directly out of their absolute identity with the poem in the aesthetic experience. 
As the criticism of Maurice Blanchot most strikingly manifests, the aim of these 
critics is to write criticism which is not detached from the poetry,-or for that 
matter even about the poetry-but fundamentally at one with the poetry. At 
bottom, their effort is to write criticism in such a way that its author will be 
the poem of its concern. Such criticism is as autonomous as Frye's, not because 
it is umelated to poetry, but rather because it is indistinguishable from poetry. 
Although such visionary or orgiastic monism avoids the pains of the New 
Criticism as effectively as Frye's positivistic dualism does, the point of it all 
I 
I 
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seems no less dubious than the value of Frye's criticism. We desire the truth 
about beauty, not truth about nothing or beauty about beauty. Both radical 
dualism and radical monism seem to evade the difficulties of the New Criticism 
by ceasing to be criticism in any serious sense at all. 
When Gentile came to write The Philosophy of Art, Italian thought about 
the relationship between poetry and criticism was not in so hopeless a predica-
ment as that of the New Criticism and its remnants. For thirty years Croce 
had been striving to reconcile the dualistic and monistic aspects of the relation-
ship. His maturest resolution of the problem is based upon a tripartite concep-
tion of criticism as taste, judgment, and characterization. Initially the critic must 
become the poem, experiencing it as an intuition-expression "from the point 
of view)) of the poet. Taste and genius are identical. This first moment of 
criticism, however, is virtually inarticulate; its conclusion can be no more than 
"Eureka" or "ugh" or a blend of the two. The second, judgmental moment 
of criticism detennines the categorical being of the first moment: it judges the 
experience to have been aesthetic, unaesthetic, or a mixture of the two. The 
third moment is a practical, approximate characterization of the uniqueness of 
the judged experience. It is meant to synthesize the first MO moments of 
criticism, the moment in which one is aesthetically identical with the poem and 
the moment in which one is judgmentally detached from the poem. Experien-
tially, Croce's analysis seems to work out the problems which broke the New 
Criticism and which have been simply evaded by its followers. Unfortunately, 
however, his analysis depends on three unexamined and unjustified dogmas: the 
poem experienced is the poem; the poem judged is the poem experienced; and 
the poem characterized is the poem as experienced and judged. Croce never 
explicated the relations among the three moments of criticism; they are simply 
strung out as distinct; their unity is uncritically assumed to be a "synthesis." 
Not only his philosophy of art but the whole of Gentile's philosophy of 
Actualism was de'dicated to an enquiry into the nature of the unity of human 
experience on the basis of which he could articulate its necessary inner relation-
ships. As early as 1912, Gentile was evolving his concept of Actualism as a 
philosophy without presuppositions or dogmas. All depends for him on the 
incontrovertible truth and reality of "my present act of thinking." The propo-
sition, "I am thinking," and only this proposition, cannot be denied or even 
questioned without its being affirmed, since to deny and to question are acts of 
thinking. "My present act of thinking" differs markedly from the phenom-
enological "consciousness of something," with its "of" being the relationship 
of "intentionality" and its every "something" an "intended object." Gentile 
recognizes that to be conscious is to be self-conscious, that to know something 
requires that one knows that he knows something. As Collingwood observed, 
even etymologically, "con-scious" implies this double awareness. As a result, 
in the very act of thinking one can attend not only to his U I" and its "object," 
but also to the way in which they are related. Gentile need not posit a neces-
sary "intentionality" which cannot be attended to experientially, with the con-
sequence, as in Husserl, that all attention slides inexorably away from "inten-
tionality" to the" intended object." "My present act of thinking" is for Gentile 
a mediate act in which one thinks through the way self and not-self are related 
just as fully as he thinks through self and not-self. Instead of the relation 
between transcendental Ego and Object being merely necessary, like "Inten-
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tionality," that relation for Gentile is both necessary and actual. Because all 
consciousness involves seH-consciousness, the relation between "ego" and "ob~ 
jeet" is experientially open to inspection. 
Even for Gentile, however, the relation proved extremely difficult to attend 
'0. Prior to The Philosophy of Art, his dialectical concept of the act of thinking 
tended to collapse into' two tenns only, my thinking an object and that object 
as though~ 50 that the immediate I, the thesis, and the mediate I, the synthesis, 
fell into an immediate identity. Thus; an enquiry into what might seem' to be 
subjectively immediate, like "sensation" or "intuition," reveals that in truth 
they are mediate. Just so, the immediate I becomes the mediate I; artd art 
becomes philosophy, immediate intuition-expression becomes in its truth rela ... 
tiona! thinking. 
The real problem~ then, for Gentile in The Phi/(}sophy of Art was not how 
to relate poetry and criticism, but how to tell them apart. The essence of art 
is the I in its immediacy, my most immediate sense of experience. Bur to exist, 
this immediacy must break into its antithesis, the non-I, and to be actual both 
immediate thesis and objective antithesis must be included within the synthetic act 
of my thinking. But criticism, the act of thinking through the uniqueness of a 
poem, also contains the" very same" three moments as the poem does. To be existent 
and actual, both poetry and criticism must be both poetic and critical. In 
avoiding dogmatic presuppositions and in making both poetry and criticism 
experientially significant and logically necessary, Gentile seems to have barred 
himself from making a distinction between poetry and criticism. Only in The 
Philosophy of Art does he overcome this weakness. He does so by rejecting 
Croce's notion of art as intuition for the notion of the essence of art as pure 
feeling. The strength of this· change lies in the fact that feeling, nnlike intuition, 
remains feeling even when its dialectical implications are fully explored. In 
nonnal usage, feeling involves three" aspects: an innennost sense of experience; 
the feel of things, the way things feel when touched or felt; and the prehensive 
act of feeling, of touching or reaching out for something. A poem", then, even 
though it includes all three moments of the dialeerical act of thinking, just as 
criticism does, differs from criticism by being dominated by feeling, by h.ving 
feeling, the first moment of the dialectic, as its essence. Criticism, even though 
it must include the moment of feeling if it is to be in touch with the poem of 
its concern, is essentially not feeling, but thinking. The critic concentrates not 
on the poem as essence or the poem as" object, but on the thoughtful act of 
feeling in which the poet strives to make the feel of things adequate to his 
innennost feeling. The critic's objective is to make what is impassioned lucid, 
to clarify the act of feeling so that it can be more fully experienced as the act 
it is, unlike any other .ct of feeling. If he finds that the poet lapses into 
abstraction or relational thinking, that he could not integrate feeling as immediate 
and the feel of things, then his characterization will include" this finding as an 
adverse judgment. 
Thus, retaining Croce's three moments of criticism in the modified fonn of a 
single act" of feeling, characterization, and judgment, Gentile relates them in a 
logically rigorous way, as Croce could not, and also relates criticism and poetry 
as a concordia discors, an identity of opposites. Poetry and criticism are identical 
because containing the same three moments; they are different because poetry 
is dominated by one of those moments, criticiSm by another. 
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The main limitation of Gentile's enquiry into the relationship between poetry 
and criticism is that he does not consider how one distinguishes between a 
critical reading which attends to the individual nature of a poem in action and 
a critical reading which makes the poem up as it goes along according to the 
innermost feeling of the critic. In his earlier thought, when he still agreed with 
Croce that a poem is an intuition-expression, Gentile indeed claimed that a poem 
is a new poem with each new reading, so that his own criticism tended to be 
as irresponsible as that of Heidegger. Although Croce could not justify it 
philosophically, he always insisted that criticism can and must be faithful to the 
poem as written. In The Philosophy of Art, Gentile recognizes that a poem 
is not identical with its critical readings, that there is a difference as well as an 
identity between poetry and criticism. But he does not face the question of 
what it is in the finest criticism that ensures that its poetic subject will be recog-
nized as an act distinct from itself as a critical act. Gentile's failure to account for 
the continuing identity of a poem in multiple readings is the main reason for his 
being neglected by contemporary Italian aestheticians. 
It seems to me, however, that The Philosophy of Art at least suggests a way 
of overcoming this limitation. M a critic reads and att:ends to and articulates 
his sense of the individual articulation of the feeling of a poem, must he not be 
most attentive to the way in which the poet listens critically to his own articula-
tion of feeling? The critic need not and should not be the only listener in 
his act of criticism. Indeed, if he is to treat the poem as an act and attend to 
its full actuality, his final responsibility is to articulate his sense of the difference 
between the poet's critical attention and his own. Thus, as he recreates and 
judges the poem, he must evoke a sense of the otherness of the poem as act 
from his own critical act and suggest the difference between the feeling domi-
nating the poem and the feeling that moves him in his criticism. As a result, 
he would find that as he judges the poem, he is granting it the_ capacity to judge 
him. The difference between the poet's attentiveness and the critic's would, it 
is true, depend on the critic's present sense of it. But by pushing his attention 
to the point of eliciting the duality of attention involved in his criticism of the 
poem, he would free the poem, or at least move it to the verge of being free, 
for further readings by critics more perceptive than he is. Drawing this sugges-
tion out may seem to tip the balance of Gentile's position from a dialectical unity 
containing duality to a dialectic whose unity is fundamentally dualistic. But if 
one considers Gentile's last book, the Genesis and Structure of Society (trans-
lated by H. S. Harris), it will be clear that he was moving in just that direction. 
Such a tendency is at least implicit, I believe, in The Philosophy of Art. 
MERLE E. BROWN 
University of Iowa 
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The" Encyclopedie" by John Lough. New York: David McKay Co., 1971. 
Pp. xii + 430. $10.00. 
Usually the best introduction to a scholarly or a literary work is a reading 
of the work itself. Commentaries should come afterwards. But in the case of 
the great French eighteenth-century Encyclopedie, this is not sensible advice. 
Anyone today who simply tries to read it will be confused without being en-
lightened. The seventeen folio letterpress volumes and the eleven folio volumes 
of plates contain about 72,000 entries and about 2,900 engravings, an embarrass-
ment of riches. The parts vary in quality: some are masterpieces; others are 
muddled, misinfonned, too terse, or almost endless. Moreover, contradictions 
abound. The hundreds of collaborators sometimes differed in their ideas, and 
the editors, Diderot and d'Alembert, did not try to impose unifonnity. There 
are, for example, articles on religion favorable to Catholicism, Protestantism, deism, 
scepticism, or atheism, articles on economics promoting governmental interven-
tion and others arguing for governmental restraint. The reader needs guidance. 
A scholar excellently qualified to supply such help is John Lough, Professor 
of French at the University of Durham, England. He has a sure grasp of the 
history of the Old Regime in general: his Introduction to Seventeenth Century 
France (Rev. ed., 1969) and his Introduction to Eighteenth Century France (1960) 
are two of the best surveys of those periods. Also, for some thirty years he has 
written about the Encyclopedie. Many of his studies have recently been col-
lected in Essays on the" Encyclopedie" of Diderot and d'Alembert (1968) and 
The '( Encyclopedie" in Eighteenth-Century England and Other Studies (1970). 
They reveal, an admirable familiarity with the work, the result of immense 
research, a critical reading of sources, and balanced judgment. 
His new book is his most ambitious. It is the first long general study of the 
EncyclopMie to appear in English. The three begioniog chapters--;;ixty pages 
in length-are mainly about the history of the enterprise. Limitations of space 
make it impossible for Professor Lough to tell this complicated and absorbing 
story in as detailed and dramatic a way as Arthur M. Wilson has done in his 
superb scholarly biography of Diderot; but Lough's discussion has virtues of its 
own. On the early history of the Encyclopedie, on its subscribers, and on its 
various editions he is the authority in the field; and we now have a handy 
summary of his conclusions. Concerning the work's immediate predecessors and 
ir..<; contributors, too little is as yet known for any scholar to be more than sug-
gestive, but Professor Lough makes some valuable remarks. For instance, he calls 
attention to the fact that not all of the early general encyclopedias were shorter 
than the Encyclopedie and that one of them, Zedler's Grosses vollstiindiges 
Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und J{iinste, was a massive work which 
deserves to be examined as a noteworthy predecessor of the Encyclopedie. 
The main part of Professor Lough's study consists of six chapters-over 300 
pages in length-on the contents of the work in relation to the thought of the 
time. Here he is selective. He deals little with the EncycIopedie as a reference 
book; and if the reader wants additional knowledge about its treattnent of his-
tory, literature, or the natural sciences, he should supplement Lough's account 
with infonnation from two French surveys of the Encyclopedie-Pierre Gros-
claude's Un audacieux message: I'Encyclopedie (1951) and especially Jacques 
Proust's L'Encyclopedie (1965). What Professor Lough chooses to stress is 
the 
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the most radical ideas of the Ency clopedie on philosophical, religious, political, 
social, and economic matters, and how these differed from the orthodox thought 
of many contemporary critics. Never before has this been done so compre-
hensively. Thanks to Jacques Proust's Diderot et l'Encyclopedie (2nd ed., 1967), 
we know what ideas the chief editor contributed on such topics as Christianity, 
absolute monarchy, and mercantilism. Now thanks to Professor Lough we can 
compare all this to the articles of d'Alembert, d'Hoibach, Jaucourt, Naigeon, 
Saint-Lambert, and other collaborators. 
Professor Lough's conclusion is not startling, but it is sound. The Encyclopedie, 
restrained by repressive authorities, was less bold than the boldest writings of 
Diderot or Voltaire. Some of its views were in fact very conservative. Never-
theless, judged as a product of the 1750's and 1760's, of the era of Madame de 
Pompadour, it was a II rallying point for men of progressive ideas," and the 
orthodox rightly saw it as a threat to the status quo in France-to Catholicism, 
to absolute monarchy, and to many current economic and social practices. "Here 
was a work which breathed a new spirit, one which was hostile to tradition 
and authority, which sought to subject all beliefs and institutions to a searching 
examination." One might add that this anti-establishment position was combined 
with a respect for learning, a reliance on reason, and a manner of expression 
frequently designed to minimize offense rather than to shock or to confront. 
Professor Lough's book is not easy to read. He discusses the ideas of a good 
number of Encyclopedists on numerous topics, sometimes in a seriated fashion. 
Also, there are so many long quotations in French that the book often resembles 
an anthology with running commentaries. This is intentional. Professor Lough, 
as he says in his preface, thinks that long quotations from the Encyclopedists 
and from their contemporary critics provide the reader with "a firsthand view 
of the outlook of the contributors" and allow one "to understand the true 
meaning of many of the articles in their eighteenth-century context." Like the I Encyclopedie itself, this book is full of useful infotmation and 'thoughtful obser-
~ vation, deserving and demanding careful study. 
~ 
I 
FRANK A. KAFKER 
University of Cincinnati 
A Kingdom for a Stage: The Achievement of Shakespeare's History Plays by 
Robert Ornstein. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. 
xii + 231. $11.00. 
Neither their popularity in the age in which they were written nor the fact 
that they represent roughly a third of his canon has encouraged a critical interest 
in the history plays of our most talented playwright. While Professor Ornstein 
in his book on the subject points out that II in the past several decades" the 
history plays have been "rescued" from "relative neglect," the rescue, like 
the neglect, has been just that-relative. The examples he cites, moreover, under-
score his observation that "though appreciation of the History Plays is greater 
now than it ever was before, so too perhaps is awareness of their flaws and 
imperfections." The subtitle of his own book announces clearly that his emphasis, 
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on the other hand, will be on the achievement of these plays. It has been some 
time since we have had a book from Professor Ornstein, but the publication of 
A Kingdom for a Stage assures us that the interval was well spent. The 
achievement of his own literary judgment is noteworthy, even when evaluated 
by the kind of criteria that one ought to apply to a critic, as Titania would 
put it, "of no mean rate." 
Yet, just as the history plays of an artist even of the first rank will naturally 
vary, so will the individual comments of a critic of Mr. Ornstein's staturc-
and this is no damning by faint praise, for he consistently offers that which is 
worthy of consideration. When one has reservations or disagreements with him, 
it probably reflects more the tendency of Shakespeareans, even more than other 
critics, to judge harshly any work that does not fall within the province (or 
is it " provinciality "?) of their own enlightened view. 
Surely among the most excellent sections of the first-rate book is his opening 
one on "The Artist as Historian," in which he argues not only that Shakespeare's 
history plays "are so different . . . from one another that it is difficult to 
generalize about their subject matter, much less about their dramatic and poetic 
I' 
qualities," but also that the plays are more experimental and daring in both i \ 
structure and theme than are his comedies. Still even his own convincing argu-
ment does not blind him either to the links between the plays or to the chrono-
logical development of Shakespeare's art in the genre. 
The chapter on Richard III is also one of his stronger chapters. Here he 
stresses the central issue as focusing upon Richard's being "better equipped to 
seize the crown than to wear it." It is in this same excellent chapter that he 
brilliantly argues for peripetia as more structural than peripheral. 
Perhaps what one views as the weaker sections of the book again depends 
on the reviewer's own limited interest and perspectives. I, for example, found 
that my preference for King John made me see Shakespeare as more than bored 
with his task of writing, and the play's" poetry, characterization, and plotting" 
as more than merely "pedestrian" and "primitive." Perhaps this disagreement 
made me more conscious of the fact that at this point Mr. Ornstein seemed to 
be answering Tillyard and Miss Campbell more than those more recent critics 
who had come to the rescue of the neglected genre. I even wondered whether 
or not Mr. Ornstein had read the rather impressive introduction to the Signet 
edition of the play by William H. Matchett, that argues with far more develop-
ment and acumen for Philip the Bastard as protagonist than any of the critics 
he chooses to refute. Of course, some of what Mr. OTIlStein sees as "new" or 
" needed" in this and other chapters derives not only from answering older 
books, but also from the admirable dedication and enthusiasm of a critic for his I t 
~tt I 
My bias .also leads me to see his chapter on Richard 11 as of far more impor-
tance than that on tile Henry VI plays, perhaps because I find them far more 
boring than King John, let alone Richard ll. In this last play, Mr. Ornstein sees 
not Tillyard's Elizabethan World Picture of Cosmic Order, but instead a dramati-
zation of Shakespeare's" awareness of man's will to discover pattern and stability 
in a universe of disorder and flux." His development of such an inclusive view 
of what Artistotle may have meant by Unity of Action, allows him, I believe, a 
richer reading of the play than most less flexible readings. 
A similarly inclusive reading of Henry V causes him to view the King neither 
J 
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as simplistically MachiaveI nor Ideal Prince, but as a man and King, who com-
pares and contrasts with, teaches and learns from, an old fat knight, his rival, 
and his father, about the relationship of the public and the private man. The 
reading includes within it, for example, standard notions about different kinds 
of honor. While others have seen the significance of this central conflict, few 
have done so, so fully. The fact that Mr. Ornstein sees this same public vs. 
private man as central to Richard 1I as well attests not to his having mounted any 
thematic hobby horse. This becomes clear as he notes instead, the implications 
of a theme that undeniably provides a major focus in both plays. 
Though there is no single theme dwelt on by Professor Ornstein (as if search-
ing for a unity for the book in which he sees the plays as so individual) there 
is one element that does distinguish his work-his almost Delphic sense of bal-
ance. Thus while his forte is clearly that of the critic, he is repeatedly aware 
that a knowledge of performance and scholarship are among his necessary critical 
tools. When he speaks of Hal in Il Henry IV, for example, he adds a note that 
reveals his eye for perfonnance: "Of course an actor playing Hal can with a 
suppressed sob or two and gestures of silent grief present a Prince overwhelmed 
with sorrow." When he writes of Henry VIII, his understanding of the scholar-
ship concerning the possible collaboration with Fletcher, leads him to focus on 
their individualistic recurring themes rather than on style and authorship merely 
as an end. When he surveys the past criticism of a play, he does so with an 
astuteness that questions even as it presents. For example, he demonstrates clearly 
and fully, I think, that we have too lazily accepted the view of that list of 
critics who see the disease imagery of II Henry IV as pervasive and incurable. 
When he reviews the criticism on Richard Il, it is his questioning again that 
leads him and us to see in the play that "paradoxically, it is the would-be pre-
servers of the status quo who become the agents of revolutionary change." When 
he speaks of the criticism which views the Ideal King as God's deputy, he notes 
with a balance that God is also usually an afterthought for Henry. While he 
is aware of pervasive Elizabethan attitudes that may have contributed to the 
shaping of Shakespeare's art, he is also balanced enough to observe that geniuses 
do not always share common attitudes. Although he is aware that Shakespeare 
is not our contemporary, his balance, like that of Ben Jonson, allows him to 
realize that Shakespeare wrote not only for his age, but for all time. Even when 
he repeatedly points to what he conceives to be a misplaced critical hypothesis 
or an improper emphasis in the work of TiIIyard and Miss Campbell, it does 
not prevent him from appreciating what he has learned from them and from 
building upon their work. His criticism, then, is not merely iconoclastic. Like 
the history plays he criticizes, it is creative as well. 
PHILIP TRACI 
Wayne State University 
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A Variorum Commentary on the Poems of John Milton, Volume Two, The 
Minor English Poems. Ed. A. S. P. Woodhouse and Douglas Bush, with a 
Review of Studies of Verse Fonn, by Edward R. Weismiller. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1972. Part One: pp. xvii + 338. $15.00. Part Two: 
pp. xi + 339-734. $15.00. Part Three: pp. xi + 735-1143. $15.00. 
One of the qualities most imperative in a variorum edition is that the infonna-
tion (and speculation) therein compiled should be clearly and accurately pre-
sented. These volumes splendidly obey this imperative. In carrying through to 
completion Professor Woodhouse's work, left unfinished at his untimely death 
in 1964, Professor Bush has perfonned a fitting tribute to his life-long friend; 
and ODe may add that these volumes are in turn a tribute to Professor Bush's 
unremitting and unstinting industry. Doubtless there are inaccuracies and mis-
prints, but doubtless they are very hard to .find-indeed, for this reviewer, and 
up to this point, impossible. 
The clarity in the arrangement of material is occasionally reduced by unavoid-
able necessities-for example, the editorial decision to take the minor poems in 
the non-chronological order of the Columbia edition, which followed the order 
of Poems (1673), so that one. must remember that Part Two is devoted to 
Lycidas (and the sonnets), whereas Part Three is devoted to the earlier Comus 
(and the psahns, plus WeismilIer's review of studies of verse fonn). And 
throughout, Bush sets himself the constant problem of preserving as much as 
possible of Woodhouse's text, which was left in widely-varying stages of com-
pletion. Hence the reader must become accustomed to the recurring use of 
square brackets, indicating Bush's additions, illustrations, comments, and occa-
sional disagreements-bracketing sometimes single sentences, sometimes para-
graphs, sometimes many pages, or even whole sections, as indicated by a 
bracketed [D.B.] after the section heading. But the user of these volumes will 
soon become accustomed to these procedures, and will be grateful for such 
clarifying details as the complete avoidance of appendices, the continuous pagi-
nation, the provision of a new (and less cryptic) set of abbreviations for indi-
vidual titles to replace those in the Columbia Works, and for the relatively 
uncluttered Bibliogtaphical Index (III.1089-1143), prepared with an eye to its 
usefulness, not its impressiveness. 
Presumably the other chief imperative for a variorum is that it should ttnly 
reflect the variety of existing commentary on its subject. It is true that compre-
hensiveness leads inevitably to the recording of ill-informed guesses and ill-
grounded objections that one wishes might be left to die of exposure on the 
mountainside. But these editors, although predictably they choose U to err on 
the side of. inclusiveness" (I.x) , are well aware of the unevenness of the mate~ 
rials they include, and are willing to be specific about the false premises, blind 
alleys, and red herrings that sometimes adorn their pages. One may begin to 
think dark thoughts while perusing the twenty pages (!) devoted to .. that two-
handed engine" (II.686-706), but at least the editors are able to distinguish "two~ 
handed" from "double-edged", and it is somehow comforting to note Professor 
Woodhouse's irritation with those who run the two together. On the whole, 
one concludes that a novice student may be puzzled, but not really hanned, by 
wandering through the blind mazes of this tangled wood, accompanied by edi-
f _. ,_ ... .-.: ,::: .... """"-. "...: 
,,' Bush's-I.x). 
Professor Weismiller's review of studies of verse fonn (111.1007-1087) will be 
rk: I vastly supplemented by his line-by-line annotations of prosody and related 
matters, including pronunciation, to comprise Volume Six in the series. To one roo 
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not expert in these perilous waves, his review appears balanced and compre-
hensible-the latter no mean virtue when the talk begins to center on prosody. 
One is pleased at the judicious recognition of achievements as various as those 
of Robert Bridges and F. T. Prince, and a bit disappointed that the New Gram-
marians have not yet given Professor Weismiller anything to review-but the 
disappointment cannot be directed at him. 
RALPH NASH 
~. Wayne State University 
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The Lyrics of Shelley by Judith Chernaik. Cleveland: Case Western Reserve 
University Press, 1972. Pp. xxii + 303. $12.50. 
On the book's inside flap, Professor Pottle, himself one of Shelley's most 
distinguished readers, calls Prof. Chernaik "one of the best readers of Shelley 
I have ever come across" and her book "original and mature" and U without 
any polemicism," and the scholarly, clearly written, and intelligent book that 
follows fulfills a good deal of this promise, offering, as a bonus, over one hun-
dred pages of newly-edited and corrected texts of the poems discussed in the 
first-half of the book. Together with the recent work of Abrams on Shelley'S 
place in Romantic thinking about apocalypse and the complex philosophical 
readings of Earl Wassennan, The Lyrics of Shelley should go a long way toward 
refuting those charges of mawkishness, imprecision, and impalpability that twen-
tieth century critics have brought against Shelley and which he has never quite 
managed to shake. There is a considerable distance between what used to be 
called the "licentious phrasing" of "The Cloud" and Mrs. Chernaik's remark 
that "any stanza" of the poem "will serve to illustrate the freedom and spon-
taneity of the imagery and its inventiveness in relation to natural fact." (133) 
Yet, there is something missing from her book which it is no easy matter to 
identify. Shelley'S rival, Keats, would have rested his diagnosis on the observa-
tion that "there is nothing to be intense upon; no women one feels mad to kiss, 
no face swelling into reality." I would have preferred to leave it at that but 
since the critical assumption behind what I am going to say-that while Mrs. 
Chemaik's book is an excellent "horse.," it ought to have been a II tiger "-may 
be erroneous, I have the obligation to be more academic than Keats. 
The book is devoted primarily to an analysis of the transformations the 
recurring images and themes of Shelley'S lyric poetry undergo as one moves 
from "Mont Blanc" (Ch. Two) to the poems to Jane Williams like "The 
Magnetic Lady to her Patient" (Ch. Seven). Sometimes these analyses center 
around a poem or two as in Chapter Three: "The Human Condition" which is 
given over almost exclusively to an analysis of " Lines Written among the 
Euganean Hills," but more often each chapter contains "mini-essays" on three 
286 BOOK REVIEWS 
or four related poems, as in Chapter Four on the" political)) odes, which are 
continually being made to echo one another and other poems by Shelley as 
well. Everything in a Shelley poem reminds Mrs. Chernaik of something some-
where else: "The same terms [of "Ode to the West Wind"J are given a 
precise metaphorical meaning in a passage from Laon and Cynthia"; (96) "The 
peculiarly mature character of the poet's lament and prayer can be seen by com-
paring it to the invocation to Alastor;" and (as an example of an interesting 
failure to echo) "the very bareness of the last nvo stanzas, the absence of any 
statement comparable to that of the closing lines of "Hymn to Intellectual 
Beauty" ... make the conclusion of the poem susceptible to a number of inter-
pretations." (95) Because Mrs. Chernaik can do this kind of circling back, 
around and through the poetry so well, she generates a sense of the cohesion 
and consistency of Shelley's poetry which, Lord knows, we have been hard 
pressed to see. But the technique is not completely satisfying, because it often 
seems a substitute for raising questions about fonn in Shelley and, above all, 
about his language, even though the examination of "The Figure of the Poet" 
in the opening chapter is supposed to function, I imagine, as the issue at stake in 
all these analyses and does, in fact, end with a good question: "How should we 
relate a theory of the imagination that insists upon its creativity, its power to 
infonn and give value to life, with a symbolic rendering of the poet as passive, 
dependent, subj ect to a vision that can neither be summoned nor recalled . . .?" 
(29) That question can be asked in still more general tenns than Prof. Chernaik 
asks it, but I do not believe it can be answered by the kind of analyses she 
makes of the poems. We need more than" As the body of the poem is framed 
by an allegory for human life, so the meditation is organized by the progress 
of the day from sunrise to sunset" (67) (and I do not believe I have mis-
represented the weakness by choosing an untypical instance) to satisfy the claims 
of the question. 
The problem appears as early as the "Introduction" to the book. H If we are 
to recover what the Romantic poet has to say to our age, we must return to 
the idea of poetry as comprehensive in scope, proposing a whole view of life, 
of society as well as the self, political and philosophical as well as psychologi-
cal." (6) Who will not welcome such a return?-until he notices the fudging 
in "proposing." We cannot recover this view-and I concur that the problem 
is profoundly political in character-because we know very little about the 
Romantic mode of proposal. There is a book out there on the politics of 
Romantic fonn still to be written which will ask Prof. Chernaik's question but 
will have to proceed from a very different conception of poetic activity and of 
the "body" of a poem if it intends to show how the "poet's function is ..• 
to create in language the forms his imagination craves." (46) But in fact the 
whole point is whether it is even possible to create such linguistic forms when 
what the Romantic imagination" craves" is a form which shall also be a process. 
When Shelley refers to his language as "Daedal" or "subtler" we may feel 
he describes less than he thinks, but he obviously intends to convey a dis-
satisfaction with available and received forms. What can serve as a model in 
this poetic predicament? One might even define the Romantic poem as the first 
poem which had to be its own-and only its own-model, which explains, 
incidentally, why Romantic poetry is as often likely to be awful as it is powerful; 
Prof. Chernaik could use a surer sense of what in Shelley it is just not possible 
to redeem. 
BOOK REVIEWS 287 
:'," She does not transmit a sense of the excitement-and the embarrassment-that 
this exploration of the possibilities of fonn entails because, in part, her own 
models for deciding when the poems work, while they are pm of the critical 
equipment we all assimilate, do not seem able to disclose the poem she affirms. 
Not the least of our debts to her book stems from its demonstration of the 
limitation of our approaches to Romantic poetry: as long as we continue to 
talk the critical language of those who have always mistrusted Romantic poetry 
the battle cannot possibly be won. The central Shelleyan text, set against the 
background of Demogorgon's view that (I a voice/ Is wanting, the deep truth is 
imageless," will probably continue to be that investigation of the relationship 
of power to fonn which is stanza XLIII of Adonais on (I plastic stress." The 
endlessly unfolding and openended character of all fonns, natural and poetic, 
which I take that passage to celebrate raises questions· about every degree of 
Romantic poetic activity: about the dynamics of poetic structure, about whether 
Romantic poems can (I end," about the status of the poem as a single unit, and, 
in the case of Coleridge, about why we do not see the U wholeness" of his 
fragments. For this reason, I believe that the image of the organizing circle 
which Prof. Abrams' brilliant new book offers to us, and which Prof. Chemaik's 
readings often seem to imply, will not totally do. The best teacher of poetry 
I know believes that the explanatory model will tum out to be not geometric 
or mathematical but biological, and a colleague, who persuades me more than 
I care to be persuaded that art is a form of propaganda, is sure the model will 
be political. (How do we distinguish a progressive poetic form from a reaction-
ary one?) In any case, while we are waiting, Prof. Chemaik's book significantly 
contributes to the debate. 
.ARNOLD T. ORZA 
University of Connecticut 
